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Authentication is an important security mechanism for detecting forged messages in a sensor network. Each cluster head (CH) in
dynamic key distribution schemes forwards a key dissemination message that contains encrypted authentication keys within its
cluster to next-hop nodes for the purpose of authentication.The forwarding path of the key dissemination message strongly affects
the number of nodes to which the authentication keys in the message are actually distributed.We propose a routing method for the
key disseminationmessages to increase the number of nodes that obtain the authentication keys. In the proposedmethod, each node
selects next-hop nodes to which the key dissemination message will be forwarded based on secret key indexes, the distance to the
sink node, and the energy consumption of its neighbor nodes.The experimental results show that the proposedmethod can increase
by 50–70% the number of nodes to which authentication keys in each cluster are distributed compared to geographic and energy-
aware routing (GEAR). In addition, the proposed method can detect false reports earlier by using the distributed authentication
keys, and it consumes less energy than GEAR when the false traffic ratio (FTR) is ≥10%.
1. Introduction
Sensor networks are large-scale computing systems that
collect the data via sensors distributed in the real world.
Sensor networks are composed of lightweight sensor nodes
and at least one sink node. They operate autonomously for a
long period of time. Sensor networks can be used for appli-
cations including battlefield reconnaissance, infrastructure
management, and smart home technology [1–5].
Sensor nodes are highly resource constrained and they
are prone to security threats including masquerade, message
replay, message modification, and denial of service (DoS)
attacks [6–8]. Authentication ensures that the identity of a
communicating entity is in fact what it claims to be [8]. In
authentication schemes [9–17], the authentication keys must
be shared among communicating nodes. This distribution
can occur in two ways: (1) static key distribution and (2)
dynamic key distribution. We focus on the dynamic key
distribution where each node encrypts its authentication key
and disseminates it throughout the network. Since authenti-
cation keys are encrypted before dissemination, a receiving
node receiving the authentication key can actually decrypt
the key only when there is a corresponding decryption
key in its memory. Hence, the forwarding path of the key
dissemination message affects the number of nodes to which
the authentication keys are distributed.
The topology and routing path changes in WSNs occur
frequently due to addition and deletion of nodes. Therefore,
we need to distribute authentication keys in each cluster to
many nodes for detecting and dropping false reports injected
through compromised nodes.
We propose a path construction method for key dis-
semination messages with the aim of increasing the number
of nodes to which the authentication keys are actually
distributed. Each node in the proposedmethodmaintains the
secret key indexes of its neighbor nodes. It selects the next for-
warding node(s) of the key dissemination message based on
(1) the number of authentication keys that can be distributed
to the neighbors, (2) the distance from the neighbors to the
sink node, and (3) the energy consumption of the neighbors.
The proposed method can increase the number of nodes to
which authentication keys are distributed, detect the false
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reports early, and reduce energy consumption. As a result, the
proposed system can prolong the network’s lifetime.
The contributions of our paper are as follows:
(i) development of a new path construction method for
key dissemination messages in order to increase the
number of nodes towhich authentication keys in each
cluster are actually distributed;
(ii) presentation of a new filtering method that exploits
the proposed path construction method to detect
false reports early and reduce the energy consumed
by the nodes in the network.
2. Related Works
Studies on route construction methods have been conducted
with the aim of improving the energy efficiency of various
authentication schemes. Key index-based routing (KIBR) [16]
was proposed to reduce the energy consumption of false
report filtering schemes. In KIBR, each node maintains the
authentication key indexes of its candidate parent nodes
(CPNs). A node receiving an event report forwards the report
to one of the CPNs, which can verify one of the message
authentication codes (MACs) in the report by considering the
authentication key indexes contained in both the report and
the CPNs.
KIBR can increase the filtering capability of authenti-
cation schemes and therefore conserve energy under false
report attacks. That is, existing authentication schemes com-
bined with KIBR can detect false reports earlier than can
those combined with the shortest path routing. Actually,
KIBR is a special case (𝛼
𝑃
= 1) of the proposed route con-
struction method. The proposed method considers not only
the key index information of the CPNs but also their energy
consumption, to achieve balanced energy consumption of
sensor nodes.Wewill describe the proposedmethod in detail
in (Section 4—Proposed Method).
The path renewal method (PARM) [17] was proposed
to enable balanced energy consumption among nodes and
energy efficiency of the filtering schemes. Each node on
the routing tree in PARM maintains the information of its
parent node and child nodes. If the remaining energy of
one node decreases below some threshold value, the node
sends an eviction message to one of its child nodes. The
node receiving the eviction message changes its parent node
based on an evaluation function. The energy consumption
and the key partition information of each CPN determine
the output value of the function. The receiving node chooses
its new parent node with the highest value of the evaluation
function. Similar toKIBR, PARMcan be exploited to enhance
the filtering capability of an existing authentication scheme,
such as statistical en route filtering (SEF) [9] and to increase
the network lifetime through balanced energy consumption
among nodes.
PARM can also be applied to route construction for key
dissemination messages. However, each node considers in
PARM the key partition information of its CPNs, which is less
specific information than the key index information. There-
fore, the proposed method can distribute authentication keys
in each cluster to more nodes on average than PARM.
One of main assumptions in the proposed method is that
each node is able to obtain its location information and its
distance to the sink node. The most direct solution, loading
GPSmodules into each node, is impractical for many reasons
such as production cost and limited energy of sensor nodes
[18]. Therefore, many schemes [18–20] for localizing sensor
nodes have been proposed by researchers.
In [18], the authors proposed a technique called AHLoS
(ad hoc localization system). AHLoS only requires a limited
fraction of the nodes to know their exact locations. Specif-
ically, AHLoS enables nodes to dynamically discover their
own location through a two-phase process: (1) a ranging
phase and (2) an estimation phase. In the ranging phase,
each node estimates its distance from its neighbors by using
ranging techniques based on received RF signal strength or
time of arrival (ToA) of radio frequency (RF) and ultrasonic
signals. In the estimation phase, nodes use the ranging
information and known location of neighboring beacon
nodes to estimate their positions.
In [19], the authors proposed a location support system
for in-building, mobile, location-dependent applications. It
allows applications running on mobile and static nodes to
learn their physical location by using “listeners” that hear
and analyze information from beacons. They use beacons
with combined RF and ultrasound signals in decentralized,
uncoordinated architecture.
In [20], the authors proposed a GPS-less algorithm for
node-position estimation. By using the algorithm, we can
compute the locations of nodes by exploiting beacon nodes
with known position. The algorithm reduces the position
estimation errors based on the supposed position of the
nodes and the distances from the beacon nodes. They imple-
mented the algorithm on typical sensor nodes with limited
resources, such as limited energy, computation speed, and
memory.
3. Background
3.1. Dynamic En Route Filtering Scheme. The dynamic en
route filtering (DEF) scheme [11] was proposed to efficiently
detect forged reports in a network in which the topology
changes dynamically. The main characteristic of DEF is that
each node updates its own authentication key on a regular
basis and disseminates the new key to other nodes. Hence it
maintains the ability to detect false reports in a networkwhere
addition and deletion of nodes occur frequently.
There are three phases in DEF: (1) the predeployment
phase, (2) the postdeployment phase, and (3) the filtering
phase. In the predeployment phase, (𝑙 + 1) secret keys and
a single seed key are assigned to each node. 𝑙 is a system
parameter that is fixed at the node deployment phase. The
secret keys are randomly selected from a global key pool
(GKP). Every node can construct its authentication key chain
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from the seed key based on the hash function. It can update
its current authentication key based on the authentication key
chain.
In the postdeployment phase, the nodes update their
authentication keys and send the new keys to their associated
cluster heads (CHs). Each authentication key is encrypted
using the secret keys of the corresponding node before it is
sent to the CH. Each CH organizes a key dissemination mes-
sage and forwards it to 𝑞 next-hop nodes. A node receiving
the key dissemination message compares the indexes of the
secret keys to encrypt the authentication keys and the indexes
of its own secret keys. If there is a matching secret key, the
node can decrypt the corresponding authentication key and
store the key in its memory.
In the filtering phase, sensing nodes update their authen-
tication keys, generate sensing reports, and send them to
the associated CHs. Each sensing report contains a MAC
generated using the new authentication key of the sending
node. The CH organizes the final report and forwards it to
the next-hop nodes. In addition, the CH sends a new key
dissemination message that contains the authentication keys
used for endorsing the final report to the next nodes. The
nodes on the forwarding path verify the final report based
on the authentication keys they have just obtained from the
new key dissemination message. If the verification fails, they
drop the report. Figure 1 illustrates the postdeployment phase
of DEF.
The circle with dotted lines represents a cluster of nodes.
Each node stores an authentication key chain and (𝑙+1) secret
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Figure 1: Postdeployment phase of DEF.
its memory. It then forwards the message to the 𝑞 next-hop
nodes based on the underlying routing protocol.
3.2. Geographical and Energy-Aware Routing (GEAR). Geo-
graphical and energy-aware routing (GEAR) [21] is a routing
protocol that considers the distance to the destination and
energy consumption of neighbor nodes at each node when
choosing the next node on the forwarding path.The objective
of GEAR is to achieve balanced energy consumption among
nodes and improve overall energy efficiency, leading to an
increase in network lifetime. Each node in GEAR selects
the next node on the message forwarding path based on the
learned cost as shown in the following equation:
ℎ (𝑁, 𝑅) = ℎ (𝑁min, 𝑅) + 𝐶 (𝑁,𝑁min) . (2)
In (2), ℎ(𝑁, 𝑅) is the learned cost from the node 𝑁 to the
destination 𝑅 of the message. It is determined as the sum of
the least learned cost ℎ(𝑁min, 𝑅) of its neighbors and the link
cost𝐶(𝑁,𝑁min).The following equation shows the derivation
of the estimated cost from the node 𝑁 to 𝑅, which is the
default value for ℎ(𝑁, 𝑅):





) areweight values for the two factors: the
distance from the node𝑁 to the destination𝑅 and the energy
consumption of the node 𝑁, respectively. GEAR can deliver
25–35% more packets in a uniform traffic environment than
can greedy perimeter stateless routing (GPSR) [22], which is
a geographic routing protocol.
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4. Proposed Method
4.1. Operation. When a node in DEF forwards a key dis-
semination message, it selects 𝑞 next-hop nodes based on
the distance or hop counts from each neighbor to the
sink node, the link quality from the neighbor to the sink
node, and the energy consumption of the neighbor. A node
receiving the key dissemination message can obtain one of
the authentication keys from the message only when it can
decrypt the authentication key by using one of its secret
keys. Hence, the forwarding path of the key dissemination
message strongly affects the number of nodes to which the
authentication keys in the message are actually distributed,
as shown in Figure 2.
In Figure 2, the number of nodes that obtain at least one
authentication key from the key dissemination message on
forwarding path 2 is larger than the number on forwarding
path 1 because of the distribution of secret keys belonging
to the nodes on the paths. We can increase the number of
nodes that obtain at least one authentication key from the key
dissemination message by selecting, at each node, the 𝑞 next-
hop nodes with consideration for the secret key indexes of the
neighbor nodes. We will discuss this further in Section 5.
There are several assumptions in the proposedmethod, as
follows. Each node deployed in the network field is aware of
the distance between itself and the sink node. The density of
the nodes is sufficient such that each node is associated with
at least one candidate parent node (CPN), which is one that
can be selected as the next node to which a key dissemination
message or an event report will be forwarded. Sensor nodes
after deployment organize themselves into several clusters
autonomously. We can exploit any clustering methods such
as PebbleNet [23] and LEACH [24].
We assume that the sensor field is divided into a geo-
graphic grid and sensor nodes within the same cell organize a
cluster. Each cluster is composed of one CH and a few mem-
ber nodes. The member nodes send their new authentication
keys and sensing reports to their CH, and the CH organizes
and forwards to the next node a key dissemination message
or a final event report. The sink node manages a GKP which
is a set of secret keys shared by the nodes in the network.
Each node generates its own authentication key chain from
its seed key based on a hash function. It periodically updates
its current authentication key based on the key chain. The
length of the authentication key chain is sufficiently long such
that each node can repetitively update its authentication key
during its lifetime.
In the predeployment phase, a seed authentication key
to authenticate/verify event reports and secret keys to
encrypt/decrypt authentication keys are distributed to each
node. Figure 3 illustrates the predistribution of the keys in the
predeployment phase.
The GKP is composed of 𝑁 secret keys and we assign 𝑘
secret keys, which are randomly selected from the GKP, to
each node before deployment. Then, the probability of any
two nodes sharing at least one secret key is as follows [11]:

























Figure 2: Effects of the forwarding path of a key dissemination
message on key dissemination.
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Figure 3: Predistribution of a seed authentication key and secret
keys.
where 𝑘 is the number of secret keys loaded onto each node
and is limited by the memory size of each node. For example,
if the size of each key is 64 bits and 𝑘 = 50, the memory
overhead becomes 400 bytes.
For a given 𝑘, 𝑘/𝑁 should not be too small because the
ratio affects the probability𝑝 that any two nodes share at least
one secret key. For example, if 𝑘 = 50 and 𝑁 = 1000, then
𝑝 ≈ 0.93. In another case, however, if 𝑘 = 50 and𝑁 = 10000,
then 𝑝 ≈ 0.22, which is too low.
Every node can construct its own authentication key





). The node may store the
entire authentication key chain in its memory, but it is also
possible that it may store only one key for a given time and
periodically update the key in order to minimize memory
overhead. When we do not store the authentication key
chain in the node, the node only stores the seed key and
the hash function and generates new authentication key
whenever it is necessary. That is, the new authentication
key AK
𝑖
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computation overhead for authentication key update but will
reducememory overhead for storing thewhole key chain.The
orders of authentication key generation and authentication
key usage are opposite. Hence, a node initially uses the
authentication key AK
1





, . . . ,AK
𝑚
. This mechanism provides
“forward secrecy,” whichmeans that even if an attacker comes
to know an authentication key, the next authentication key
to be used cannot be predicted because of the one-way
property of the hash chain. An authentication key of each
node is updated in every single round that is defined as a
period between two consecutive cluster reorganizations due
to addition and deletion of nodes. We assume that a round
is composed of 100 events. We also assume that the length
of each authentication key chain is sufficiently long to enable
periodic update of an authentication key of a node’s lifetime.
Additionally, a group key𝐾
𝐺
is assigned to each node to pro-
vide authenticity to controlmessages. If a node in the network
is compromised, the group key should be updated and dis-
tributed to the remaining nodes. Secure and efficient method
to update and distribute the group key is out of scope of the
paper.
In the neighbor discovery phase, each node broadcasts
a Hello message within its transmission range. The Hello
message contains the sender’s ID, the distance from the
sender and the sink node, the secret key indexes of the sender,
and aMAC.TheMAC in theHellomessage is generated using
the group key 𝐾
𝐺
and it is exploited to detect a forged Hello
message.
The node receiving the Hello message verifies the mes-
sage, and if the verification result is true, it replies to the
sender with a Response message. The Response message
includes the receiver’s ID, the distance from the receiver to
the sink node, the energy consumption of the receiver, the
secret key indexes of the receiver, and a MAC. The MAC in
the Responsemessage is generated using the group key and is
used for detecting a forged Responsemessage. Figure 4 shows
the exchange ofHello andResponsemessages amongneighbor
nodes.
When the node sending the Hello message receives a
Response message from one of its neighbors, it verifies the
MAC using its group key. If the verification succeeds, it adds
the receiver’s ID to its neighbor nodes list. It also stores the
distance from the neighbor to the sink node, the energy
consumption of the neighbor, and the secret key indexes of
the neighbor in the list. If the neighbor is closer to the sink
node than the current node, it can be selected by the current
node as a next node to which a key dissemination message or
an event report can be forwarded. In the proposed method,
we define such a neighbor node as a candidate parent node
(CPN) of the current node.Theneighbor discovery phase and
the following key dissemination phase are executed in every
round.
In the key dissemination phase, each node except the CH
updates its authentication key, encrypts the authentication
key using one of its secret keys, and sends the authentication
key to the CH.The CH collects the encrypted authentication
keys from its member nodes and generates a key dissemi-

























































) used for encryption of the authentication













). Any encryption algorithms, such asRC4 [25] and
TEA [26], can be exploited for the encryption/decryption of
authentication keys.
After creation of the key dissemination message, the CH
selects a few nodes from among its CPNs and forwards the
key dissemination message to them. The number of CPNs
selected for the next-hop nodes at each node is determined by
the system parameter BRANCH FACTOR(BF). For example,
if the BF is two, every node on the forwarding path selects two
CPNs as the next-hop nodes.
The topology of a sensor network may change frequently
for many reasons such as low duty cycle [27], energy
depletion, or destruction of sensor nodes. Therefore, the
value of BF should be larger than one so that the proposed
method adapts to the dynamic topology changes of the
network. As BF increases, the number of nodes to which
authentication keys are distributed increases. However, if
BF is too large, the number of different authentication keys
stored at sensor nodes may decrease due to limited memory
of the sensor nodes. For DEF, in [11], the authors selected
the values (2–6) for BF. Therefore, we assumed that BF is
two in our experiments, which are described in (Section 5—
Experimental Results).
The CH and other forwarding nodes derive the fitness
values of their CPNs to be selected as the next-hop nodes
based on the evaluation function in
𝑓 (𝑁) = 𝛼𝑃 ⋅ DK (𝑁) − (1 − 𝛼𝑃) ⋅ {DI (𝑁) + EC (𝑁)} . (6)
In (6),𝑁 is one of CPNs of the current node and DK(𝑁)
is the number of authentication keys that node𝑁 can obtain
from the key dissemination message. The current node can
derive the value of DK(𝑁) by considering the secret key
indexes of node 𝑁 and the secret key indexes of the key
dissemination message. DI(𝑁) and EC(𝑁) correspond to the
distances from node 𝑁 to the sink node and the energy
consumption of node 𝑁, respectively. The parameters 𝛼
𝑃
and (1 − 𝛼
𝑃
) represent the weight values for the terms. The
current node computes the evaluation function for each CPN
and selects BF nodes from among them to be the next-hop
nodes. It then forwards the key dissemination message to
6 The Scientific World Journal
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∙ B → A, C
∙ A → B
∙ C → B
MACK𝐺(B’s ID ‖ B’s dist. to sink ‖ B’s secret key indexes)}
{A’s ID ‖ B’s ID ‖ A’s dist. to sink ‖ A’s energy consumpt. ‖ A’s secret key indexes ‖ 
MACK𝐺(A’s ID ‖ B’s ID ‖ A’s dist. to sink ‖ A’s energy consumpt. ‖ A’s secret key indexes)}
{C’s ID ‖ B’s ID ‖ C’s dist. to sink ‖ C’s energy consumpt. ‖ C’s secret key indexes ‖ 
MACK𝐺(C’s ID ‖ B’s ID ‖ C’s dist. to sink ‖ C’s energy consumpt. ‖ C’s secret key indexes)}
Figure 4: Neighbor discovery process using Hello and Response messages.
the selected next-hop nodes. Figure 5 illustrates the internal
operation of a node that receives a key dissemination mes-
sage.
When a node receives a key dissemination message, it
first initializes the values of the input parameters (DK, DI,
and EC) and output variable (fitness value 𝑓) of a candidate
node. It also initializes the number of iterations (𝑖) to zero.
If the number of iterations is less than the number of CPNs
of the receiving node, it computes the DK, DI, and EC of
the next CPN and derives the corresponding fitness value of
the CPN. Then the receiving node increases the number of
iterations by one. After computing fitness values for all the
CPNs, the receiving node selects BF nodes with the highest
fitness values among all the CPNs. Finally, it forwards the
key dissemination message to the selected nodes. Figure 6
illustrates the forwarding of the key dissemination message
in the proposed method.
The gray circles in Figure 6 represent the nodes selected as
the next-hop nodes by the nodes on the key-dissemination-
message forwarding path. In the above example, the BF is two,
and therefore each node selects two nodes with the highest
fitness values from among its CPNs.
A node receiving a key dissemination message compares
its secret key indexes with the secret key indexes in the
key dissemination message. If there is a matching secret
key, the node decrypts the corresponding authentication key
and stores the authentication key with the corresponding
node ID and the authentication key index in its memory.
The maximum number of hops for each key dissemination
message is limited by the system parameter time-to-live
(TTL).
In the data dissemination phase, member nodes of each
cluster generate sensing reports and send them to their CH
periodically or when an event occurs. A sensing report is
composed of the sensing data, the sensing node’s ID, the
authentication key index of the sensing node, and the MAC
generated using the authentication key.TheCH organizes the
final report from the received sensing reports. The format of




































) of the sensing
nodes. The CH selects from among its CPNs the next-hop
node to which the final report will be forwarded:
𝑓
󸀠
(𝑁) = 𝛼𝑃 ⋅ DK
󸀠
(𝑁) − (1 − 𝛼𝑃) ⋅ {DI (𝑁) + EC (𝑁)} . (8)
In (8),𝑁 is a CPN of the current node and𝑓󸀠(𝑁) is the fitness
value of node 𝑁 to be selected as the next node to which
the final report will be forwarded. DK󸀠(𝑁) is the number of
authentication keys node𝑁 has previously obtained from the
source cluster in the last key dissemination phase. DI(𝑁) and
EC(𝑁) correspond to the distance from node 𝑁 to the sink
node and the energy consumption of node 𝑁, respectively.
The parameter 𝛼 is the weight value for DK󸀠(𝑁).
Each node on the forwarding path of the final report
derives the fitness values of its CPNs and chooses the node
with the maximum fitness value as the next-hop node on
the forwarding path. Then, it forwards the final report to the
selected node.
A node receiving the final report compares the authen-
tication key indexes in its memory with the authentication
key indexes in the final report. If there is a matching
authentication key, the node verifies the correspondingMAC
and forwards it to the next node only when the verification
result is true. If the verification fails, the false report is
detected and removed by the receiving node.





Select BF nodes with the highest f values 
and forward the key dissemination 
message to the selected nodes
candidate node
Calculate DK, DI, EC, and f of ith i = i + 1
Initialize DK, DI, EC, f
i = 0
i < num. candidates?
Figure 5: Internal operation of a node that receives a key dissemination message.
4.2. Computation Overhead of the Proposed Method. We
assume that one of the cluster-based routing protocols is
exploited in the proposed method. Therefore, only CHs
evaluate fitness values of their CPNs and forward key dis-
semination messages or event reports to the selected next-
hop nodes. According to sensor network applications, a CH
may be a powerful device (e.g., with greater battery power,
more capable CPU, and longer transmission range) or it can
be a normal sensor node. The evaluation function shown
in (6) is composed of primitive operators such as addition,
subtraction, multiplication, and comparison.
Let us assume that 𝑛 is the number of authentication
keys in each key dissemination message and 𝑘 is the number
of secret keys assigned to each node. Then, a CH performs
𝑛 ∗ 𝑘 comparison for computing DK(𝑁) (i.e., the number
of authentication keys that node 𝑁 can obtain from the
key dissemination message), one addition, two subtraction,
and two multiplication operations for computing the fitness
values of its CPNs. In addition to that, the CH sorts the list
of CPNs based on their fitness values. The computational
complexity of a sorting algorithm is (𝑛𝑐 log 𝑛𝑐), where 𝑛𝑐
is the number of CPNs. However, in our proposed method
the value of 𝑛𝑐 is small (between 1 and 5) and therefore the
execution time is short. As a result, the computation overhead
of the proposed method is practical for typical sensor nodes.
4.3. Impact of Node Density on Key Dissemination. We
assumed, in (Section 4.1—Operation), that the node density
is sufficient so that each node is associated with at least one
CPN.Therefore, we need to analyze the relationship between
the node density 𝑑 and the number of CPNs 𝑛𝑐.
If the transmission range of each node is 𝑟, then the area
within the transmission range of the node should be 𝜋𝑟2. The
number of neighbor nodes within the area, 𝑛, determines 𝑛𝑐,
which is the number of CPNs, probabilistically.
The probability 𝑝 that a node does not have any candidate










































Figure 6: Key dissemination in the proposed method.








According to (11), we can then represent the relationship
between the node density 𝑑 and the probability 𝑝 as shown
in Figure 7.
We can see in Figure 7 that, as the node density 𝑑
increases, the probability 𝑝 that a node does not have
any candidate parent node decreases. In addition, as the
transmission range 𝑟 of a node increases, the probability 𝑝
also decreases. For example, when 𝑟 = 50 and 𝑑 = 0.0001,
𝑝 = 58%, and when 𝑟 = 58 and 𝑑 = 0.005, 𝑝 = 6.6%. In
another case, when 𝑟 = 100 and 𝑑 = 0.0004, 𝑝 is almost zero.
As we explained in (Section 4.2—ComputationOverhead
of the Proposed Method) only CHs can participate in the
forwarding process of the key dissemination messages and
event reports in the proposed method. That is, the number
of CPNs for a given CH is actually the same as the number of
neighboring CHs within its transmission range. Therefore, a
clustering scheme should guarantee at least BF (i.e., a branch
factor) neighboring CHs for each CH. If the number of
neighboring CHs is less than BF, the number of CPNs of
the CH becomes less than BF. As a result, the number of
nodes to which the authentication keys in the source cluster
are actually distributed is decreased. On the other hand, if
the number of neighboring CHs is too large (e.g., 20), the
computation overhead to perform the evaluation function









































































Trans. range = 50 m
Trans. range = 100 m
Node density (nodes/m2)
Figure 7: The probability of no candidate parent node versus the
node density.
For example, CHs are elected in LEACH [24] based on
a probabilistic approach. Therefore, we can easily control 𝑛𝑐
(the number of CPNs for each CH) by choosing the desired
percentage of CHs based on the total number of nodes and
the field size. On the other hand, a node decides its role in
the PebbleNet [23] based on its weight value and the weight
values of its neighbor nodes. That is, for a given CH all the
other nodes within its transmission range become ordinary
nodes within the cluster. Therefore, it is hard to control the
number of CHs in PebbleNet. Since we assume that we need
at least BFneighboring CHs for a given CH, LEACH is more
suitable for the proposed method compared to PebbleNet.
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5. Experimental Results
In our experiments the size of the network field is 500 ×
500m2 and includes 1,000 sensor nodes. Each cluster is
organized by ten sensor nodes. The size of each cluster is
50 × 50m2, and hence, there are 100 clusters in the field. The
transmission range of each node is 50m.
The GKP is composed of 100 secret keys. Each node
is assigned five secret keys from the GKP. It can also
store its own authentication key, and it can obtain at most
ten authentication keys from other clusters for false report
detection.
We assume that in our experiment the branch factor BF
for forwarding the key dissemination message is two, both
using GEAR and using the proposedmethod.Therefore, each
node forwards the key dissemination message to at most two
of its neighbors. The weight value of 𝛼
𝐺
for GEAR is 0.5,
whereas the weight value of 𝛼
𝑃
for the proposed method
varies from zero to one.
We assumed in the proposed method that every message
(including the key dissemination message and the final event
report) has the same length of 36 bytes, since TinyOS [28]
uses packets of 36 bytes or less. The energy consumption
for sending/receiving one byte is 16.25/12.5 𝜇J and the energy
consumption for verifying a MAC in the final report is 75 𝜇J
[29, 30].
Each final report contains five MACs, one of which is a
false MAC when the report was forged by an attacker. The
false traffic ratio (FTR) is the number of false reports divided
by the total number of final reports generated and forwarded.
We performed experiments for various FTR values (0–100%).
The proposed method selects the next nodes to which
the key dissemination messages or final event reports are
forwarded based on the secret key indexes of CPNs. There-
fore, the proposed method can increase the number of nodes
to which authentication keys in each cluster are distributed.
Figure 8 shows the average number of nodes that obtain
authentication keys from a source cluster in GEAR and the
proposed method (PRM).
As the value of 𝛼
𝑃
for the evaluation function of the
proposed method increases, the priority of the DK(𝑁) in
(6) increases. Therefore, the number of nodes that obtain





= 0.4, the number of nodes that obtain the
authentication keys from a cluster in the proposed method
is 162% (25.6) of the number in GEAR (15.9). The proposed
method does not choose the shortest path from the source
cluster to the sink node for final reports. Therefore, we need
to measure the average hop counts that the normal or false
report passes, to analyze the energy efficiency of the proposed
method. Figure 9 illustrates the average hop count per normal
report in GEAR and in the proposed method.
In the proposed method, the number of hops per normal
report increases as 𝛼
𝑃
increases. To illustrate, when 𝛼
𝑃
=
0.2, the number of hops that a normal report passes in the
proposed method is 104% of that in GEAR. In another case,
even when 𝛼
𝑃
= 1, the number of hops in the proposed
method is 109% of that of GEAR. Therefore, the proposed
























































































Figure 8: Average number of nodes that obtain authentication keys






























































































































































Figure 10: Average hop counts for a false report.
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shows the average hop count per false report in GEAR and in
the proposed method.
It is obvious that the proposed method reduces the
average hop counts per false report significantly compared
to GEAR. For example, when 𝛼
𝑃
= 0.2, the number of hops
that a false report passes in the proposed method is 70% of
that in GEAR. In another case, when 𝛼
𝑃
= 0.8, the number
of hops that a false report passes in the proposed method
is 48% of that in GEAR. Therefore, the proposed method
significantly reduces the average hop count before a false
report is detected. From the above results, we can derive the
energy consumption for forwarding final reports for varying
FTR values, as in Figure 11.
It is evident that GEAR consumes less energy for forward-
ing final reports than the proposedmethod when FTR < 10%.
The reason for this is that the average hop count for a normal
report in the proposed method is higher than in GEAR.
However, when FTR ≥ 10%, the proposed method consumes
less energy than GEAR since the average hop count for a
false report in the proposed method is far less than GEAR.
For example, when FTR = 50%, the energy consumption for
forwarding final reports in the proposed method (𝛼
𝑃
= 0.6)
is 80% of that in GEAR.
The number of secret keys assigned to each node from the
GKP is determined by the systemparameter 𝑘 in the proposed
method. The value of 𝑘 affects the performance of the pro-
posed method in terms of (1) the number of authentication
keys obtained from key dissemination messages by a node
and (2) the average hop counts for a false report. Therefore,
we observed the impact of 𝑘 on the performance of the
proposed method based on the two performance measures
through experiments, as follows. Figure 12 shows the number
of authentication keys obtained by each node for different 𝑘
values.
In the experiment, the total number of secret keys in the
GKP is 100, and the maximum number of authentication
keys that a node can obtain from other clusters (through key
dissemination messages) is 10. We can see that the larger the
value of 𝑘, themore the authentication keys a node can obtain
from other clusters through key dissemination messages.
When 𝑘 is 5, 10, 15, or 20, a sensor node can, respectively,
obtain on average 3.33, 4.33, 4.92, or 5.18 keys from other
clusters. On the other hand, the degree of performance
improvement decreases as 𝑘 increases because the number
of authentication keys that a sensor node can obtain from
other clusters is limited by the fixed memory size of the
nodes. Moreover, key dissemination messages are forwarded
through the paths that are composed of nodes with high
fitness values. Therefore, the authentication keys tend to be
concentrated at some nodes, which leads to a lack of memory
in the nodes. Figure 13 shows the average hop counts for a
false report for different 𝑘 values.
As we have seen in Figure 12, as the value of 𝑘 increases,
the number of authentication keys a node obtains from
other clusters increases.Therefore, the probability that a node
detects a false report also increases and the average number
of hops per false report decreases. When 𝑘 is 5, 10, 15, or 20,
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Figure 12: The number of authentication keys obtained by each
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and 8.46 hops, respectively, by the intermediated nodes on
the forwarding path.
For the same reason as for the results shown in the
Figure 12, the degree of performance improvement in terms
of the average number of hops per false report is limited as 𝑘
increases. In summary, as the number of secret keys assigned
to each node from the GKP increases, the performance of
the proposed method is improved. However, the degree of
improvement is limited because of the memory constraints
of nodes.
6. Conclusion
Authentication is an important security mechanism used for
detecting forgedmessages in a sensor network. In the authen-
tication key dissemination phase, the routing paths of the key
dissemination messages strongly affect the number of nodes
to which authentication keys are distributed. Here, we have
proposed a routing method for key dissemination messages
that increase the number of nodes to which authentication
keys are actually distributed.The selection of next-hop nodes
to which the key dissemination message is forwarded is
based on the secret key indexes, the distance to the sink
node, and the energy consumption of the CPNs. We have
confirmed through experimentation that, in the proposed
method, authentication keys in a cluster are distributed to an
average of 50–70% more nodes than in GEAR. In addition,
when FTR > 10%, the proposedmethod consumes 49–95% of
the energy in GEAR for forwarding final reports. As a result,
the proposed method can detect false reports earlier and so
prolong the network lifetime.
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